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Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the 
Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct 
Randal D. Heeb,* William E. Kovacic,**  
Robert C. Marshall,*** and Leslie M. Marx****, ***** 
Apart from selling finished products made from carbon, such as carbon 
brushes, members of the cartel also sold “blocks” of carbon, which have 
been pressed but not yet cut and tooled into brushes or other products. A 
number of third-party “cutters” purchase these blocks of carbon, cut and 
work them into final products and sell them to customers. These cutters, 
while customers of the cartel members, also represent competition to them 
for finished products. Such cutters are typically located in the Middle East 
or Eastern Europe, but a number of them are located in the EEA 
[European Economic Area]. The policy of the cartel consisted in fixing the 
prices of carbon blocks sold to cutters in such a way that competition from 
them for the finished products made out of those blocks would be limited. 
As a result, cutters would usually only obtain small customers that were of 
no interest to the large suppliers. Ideally, at least in the view of some 
members, cutters should be eliminated altogether by refusing to supply to 
them.1  
I . INTRODUCTION 
Discussions about the relationship between European and US competition 
policy today focus extensively on standards for evaluating the conduct of 
                                                 
*  Bates White, LLC. 
**  Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission; Professor, George Washington University Law 
School (on leave). 
***  Penn State University. 
****  Duke University.  
***** The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Federal Trade Commission or its individual Commissioners. Coauthors Marshall and Marx thank 
the Human Capital Foundation (http://hcfoundation.ru/en/) for its support. 
1  Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and Graphite Products, Case COMP/E-2/38.359, 2004/420/EC, 
¶154 (Dec 3, 2003), available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ 
antitrust/cases/decisions/38359/en.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2009).  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957300
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dominant firms. In both jurisdictions, there is awareness that various forms of 
dominant firm behavior present both anticompetitive and procompetitive 
possibilities. In a number of cases there appear to be procompetitive 
motivations for conduct that may also have anticompetitive effects.  
Economic theory is sometimes ambiguous about whether and under what 
conditions a particular type of conduct is on balance pro- or anticompetitive. 
For example, slotting allowances and exclusive-dealing contracts are two 
practices that may be anticompetitive in some situations but not in others. 
Slotting allowances are fixed fees paid by manufacturers to retailers ostensibly to 
obtain access to shelf space, defray upfront costs, and support downstream 
promotional activities.2 A prominent theory of competitive harm posits that a 
large manufacturer may abuse its dominance when it uses upfront payments to 
bid up the price of scarce shelf space in order to raise its rivals’ costs.3 An 
alternative view is that slotting allowances enhance social welfare by giving 
retailers an efficient way to allocate scarce retail shelf space.4 In antitrust law, 
                                                 
2  See Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), Report on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting 
Allowances and Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry 1 (Feb 2001), available online at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/slottingallowancesreportfinal.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2009); 
FTC, Slotting Allowances in the Retail Grocery Industry: Selected Case Studies in Five Product Categories iv–
viii (Nov 2003), available online at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/slottingallowancerpt031114.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2009); David 
Balto, Recent Legal and Regulatory Developments in Slotting Allowances and Category Management, 21 J Pub 
Poly & Mktg 289, 292–94 (2002) (all discussing the modern use and competitive implications of 
slotting allowances).  
3  See Canadian Bureau of Competition, The Abuse of Dominance Provisions (Sections 78 and 79 of the 
Competition Act) as Applied to the Canadian Grocery Sector Section 5.2.1 (Nov 2002), available online at 
<http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01642.html> (visited Apr 8, 
2009); FTC, Report on Slotting Allowances at 37 (2001) (cited in note 2); Paul N. Bloom, Gregory T. 
Gundlach, and Joseph P. Cannon, Slotting Allowances and Fees: Schools of Thought and the Views of 
Practicing Managers, 64 Mktg 92, 96 (2000). See also Leslie M. Marx and Greg Shaffer, Upfront 
Payments and Exclusion in Downstream Markets, 38 Rand J Econ 823, 824 (2007) (slotting allowances 
may arise in environments with buyer power and may result in exclusion of some retailers); Greg 
Shaffer, Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices, 22 Rand J 
Econ 120, 121 (1991) (slotting allowances can benefit retailers because by not seeking a lower 
wholesale price, a retailer “essentially announces its intention to be less aggressive in its pricing”). 
4  The typical story posits that each manufacturer possesses private information about whether its 
product will be a “success” or “failure” in the marketplace, and that by offering slotting fees the 
manufacturer can credibly convey this information to retailers. See, for example, Martin A. 
Lariviere and V. Padmanabhan, Slotting Allowances and New Product Introductions, 16 Mktg Sci 112, 
113–14 (1997); Kenneth Kelly, Antitrust Analysis of Grocery Slotting Allowances: The Procompetitive Case, 
10 J Pub Poly & Mktg 187, 187–88 (1991). See also Mary W. Sullivan, Slotting Allowances and the 
Market for New Products, 40 J L & Econ 461, 461 (1997) (slotting fees are “consistent with 
competitive behavior” and could have been caused by an increase in the supply of new products). 
Alternatively, by demanding upfront payments, retailers can effectively screen which 
manufacturers’ products are better than others. See Wujin Chu, Demand Signalling and Screening in 
Channels of Distribution, 11 Mktg Sci 327, 327–29 (1992).  
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exclusive-dealing contracts are judged by the rule of reason.5 Some authors have 
shown that exclusive dealing sometimes can enhance efficiency,6 while others 
have demonstrated that exclusive dealing may enable one firm to monopolize 
the market.7  
A number of difficulties have hampered empirical efforts to determine 
which reasoning applies in a particular circumstance.8 In trying to assess market 
effects and assess economic harm in terms of deadweight loss, the behavior of a 
single dominant firm is difficult to analyze since there is often neither a clear 
beginning date nor a clear termination date for the conduct in question. Thus, it 
is hard to find a reliable benchmark against which to assess the conduct. In 
addition, the counterfactual world in which the relevant behavior does not occur 
may be structurally different from the observed situation, making welfare 
comparisons difficult.  
In the debate over the appropriate standards for analysis under antitrust 
proscriptions against dominant-firm misconduct, many have observed that 
                                                 
5  If a substantial fraction of the retail market has been foreclosed, exclusive dealing may be found 
to 1) “substantially lessen competition” under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 USC § 14 (2000); 2) be 
“an unfair method of competition” under § 5 of the FTC Act, 15 USC § 45 (2000); and 3) be 
conduct in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 USC § 2 (2000 & Supp 2004). 
6  See Tim R. Sass, The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry, 23 Intl 
J Indust Org 203, 204 (2005); Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Contracts and 
Protection of Investments, 31 Rand J Econ 603, 609 (2000); Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J 
L Econ 1, 2 (1982).  
7  Works in this vein include Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, and John S. Wiley, Naked 
Exclusion, 81 Am Econ Rev 1137, 1137–38 (1991) (demonstrating that exclusion can arise when 
there are economies of scale in upstream production and coordination failures at the downstream 
level); Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 Am Econ Rev 388, 
398–99 (1987) (showing that exclusive-dealing contracts that contain penalty-escape clauses can 
lead to inefficient exclusion); G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter, The Competitive Effects of 
Vertical Agreements: Comment, 77 Am Econ Rev 1057, 1057–58 (1987) (giving conditions under 
which a dominant manufacturer can profitably induce a retailer to agree to exclusive dealing by 
offering a lower per-unit price that compensates the retailer for its lost revenue from not selling 
excluded manufacturers’ products). For extensions of Mathewson and Winter to allow nonlinear 
pricing, see B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106 J Pol Econ 64, 
65–68 (1998); Daniel P. O'Brien and Greg Shaffer, Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and 
Equilibrium Market Foreclosure, 6 J Econ & Mgmt Strategy 755, 755–58 (1997). See generally Ilya R. 
Segal and Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion: Comment, 90 Am Econ Rev 296 (2000); David 
Besanko and Martin K. Perry, Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products 
Oligopoly, 24 Rand J Econ 646 (1993); Marius Schwartz, The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: 
Comment, 77 Am Econ Rev 1063 (1987).  
8  Sass analyzes data on US beer distributors and obtains results that support the view that exclusive 
dealing serves to minimize manufacturer-dealer incentive conflicts and enhances social welfare. 
Sass, 203 Intl J Indust Org at 220 (cited in note 6). For other empirical work, see generally Jan B. 
Heide, Shantanu Dutta, and Mark Bergen, Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence from 
Industry Practice, 41 J L & Econ 387 (1998); Margaret E. Slade, Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of 
Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?, 108 Econ J 565 (1998).  
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conduct that generates potential concern under Section 2 of the Sherman Act or 
Article 82 of the Treaty of Europe is common in competitive industries. In these 
industries there is little hope of successfully monopolizing the market, and 
therefore the behavior must have legitimate business justifications.9 By 
extension, this observation is used to cast doubt on claims of anticompetitive 
effects of similar practices by dominant firms.  
A contrasting observation derived from the study of cartels may be used to 
make the opposite point. Conduct that an illegal cartel orchestrates to suppress 
competition might be reasonably suspected of having an anticompetitive 
rationale. For example, suppose that cartel members engage in no 
monopolization conduct before forming the cartel but implement the conduct 
after the establishment of a common scheme has increased their market power. 
Such a change in behavior suggests that the conduct benefits the cartel members 
only in the presence of market power and may suggest that the conduct seeks to 
extend or preserve the cartel’s monopoly power rather than to promote 
efficiency.  
This observation has implications for the programs undertaken by 
competition authorities in Europe, the United States, and other jurisdictions to 
challenge cartels and improper exclusionary behavior by dominant firms.10 
Rather than viewing enforcement against cartels and firms engaged in 
monopolization as discrete, self-contained endeavors, enforcement policy should 
recognize connections between the two. It seems likely that one can find 
definitive proof of the pro- or anticompetitive nature of a cartel’s 
monopolization behavior by examining the evidentiary record yielded by a cartel 
inquiry. If, as we suspect, cartels undertake these activities in trying to extend or 
preserve their monopoly, this insight would be useful to determine whether or 
not the same conduct should be viewed with suspicion when engaged in by a 
dominant firm in a similar industry. 
In this Article we propose that monopolization conduct be analyzed 
through the lens of cartel behavior. Although cartels typically suppress interfirm 
rivalry, in many instances this is not their sole focus. Many cartels operate as 
                                                 
9  See, for example, Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations 95 (Apr 2007), 
available online at <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/ 
amc_final_report.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2009).  
10  Throughout the remainder of this Article we use the term monopolization to refer to behaviors 
that would that would be candidates for monopolization under US antitrust law and to 
behavaviors that would be candidates for abuse of dominance under European Commission 
(“EC”) competition law. For a discussion of the differences between the US monopolization 
doctrine and the EC abuse-of-dominance position law, see Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, 
Global Competition Law and Economics 300–14 (Hart 2007).  
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two-stage mechanisms.11 The first stage consists of reaching a consensus on a 
plan to restrict output or otherwise curb rivalry. For many cartels, once interfirm 
rivalry is addressed, the cartel moves to the second stage of activity, in which it 
uses exclusionary behavior often featured in monopolization cases to ensure the 
effectiveness of its efforts to restrict output. To illustrate this phenomenon, we 
draw upon the records of cartel inquiries to provide examples of cartels engaging 
in overt predation against non-cartel rivals, leveraging into both downstream and 
horizontally-related markets, exclusively dealing, blocking entry, bundling, tying, 
raising rivals’ costs, and other conduct typically associated with allegations of 
monopolization.  
The analytical approach outlined in this Article illuminates the competitive 
significance of conduct by which individual dominant firms are claimed to have 
monopolized or attempted to monopolize markets. A focus on cartel 
applications of monopolization behavior has significant advantages for empirical 
investigation. First, cartel inquiries often generate a rich evidentiary record. 
Moreover, in the case of a leniency applicant, this record may include 
information provided with the active cooperation of the subject firm, a situation 
that does not arise in the context of a monopolization or dominance 
investigation. Even if much of this information is nonpublic, economists and 
lawyers in the public antitrust agencies may be able to analyze such data to 
inform policy decisions about monopolization matters. Second, unlike a single 
dominant firm whose market power may evolve gradually through time, cartels 
often begin and end at discrete moments, and for cartels that are prosecuted the 
beginning and end dates are typically known. As a result, some of the more 
complicated inference problems that arise when analyzing the behavior of a 
single dominant firm are avoided when focusing on a cartel. Specifically, a 
benchmark period can be more readily identified when analyzing cartels than 
single dominant firms. Third, the discovery record provides detail regarding the 
time span for certain kinds of monopolization behavior, such as predation or 
exclusive dealing. Thus, the incremental inference burden of endogenously 
determining when the monopolization conduct began and ended is largely 
eliminated when analyzing the behavior as an extension of cartel conduct. 
Despite the benefits of viewing cartel behavior through the lens of 
monopolization behavior, cartel behavior currently tends to be viewed as 
something distinct from anticompetitive behavior by a dominant firm. 
Enforcement agencies tend to follow the Sherman Act in categorizing 
anticompetitive behavior as either a horizontal agreement between competitors 
to suppress interfirm rivalry (Section 1) or monopolization behavior by a single 
                                                 
11  The mix of collusive and exclusionary strategies employed by a cartel is emphasized in Andrew I. 
Gavil et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective 45–53 (West 2d ed 2008).  
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dominant firm (Section 2).12 However, it may be more appropriate to view the 
behavior by some cartels as a combination of the two types of anticompetitive 
behavior. The historical record suggests that cartels often act like a single 
dominant firm, moving from the suppression of competition within the cartel 
(interfirm rivalry) to the suppression of competition from outside the cartel. 
We address the topic in three parts. In Section II, we extend a well-known 
existing framework for analyzing the competitive forces that work against 
industry profitability, Michael Porter’s “Five Forces,” to obtain a structure for 
understanding both the suppression of interfirm rivalry and monopolization 
conduct by a cartel. In Section III, we show that monopolization behaviors are 
common in practicing cartels. In Section IV, we pose a number of open 
questions and identify public-policy implications regarding the potential lessons 
from cartel behavior for understanding monopolization conduct. 
As shown by our data, cartels do in fact engage in monopolization 
conduct, although the types of behaviors and extent of that conduct vary across 
cartels. We adapt Porter’s classic “Five Forces” competitive industry analysis 
framework to categorize monopolization conduct. The adapted framework 
provides guidance to antitrust authorities investigating such conduct by cartels. 
Insights on the pro- versus anticompetitive effects of such conduct derived from 
cartel investigations can be applied to monopolization investigations in 
industries characterized by similar competitive structure. 
II. PORTER’S “FIVE FORCES” AND SECTIONS 1 AND 2 
The “Five Forces,” as defined by Michael Porter in his book Competitive 
Strategy (1980), are a fundamental component of management education.13 These 
“Five Forces,” which act against, or in support of, an industry’s profitability, are 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
12  15 USC §§ 1–2 (2009). 
13  Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors 4 (Free Press 
1980). 
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Industry
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Suppliers Buyers
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Threat of substitute products
 
Figure 1: Michael Porter’s “Five Forces”14 
An industry’s profit depends on the “Five Forces.” 
 
At the center of the diagram is a box representing interfirm rivalry. On the 
perimeter are boxes representing the threat of entry, bargaining power of 
suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, and the threat of substitute products. All 
of these forces work against the profitability of an industry. Although the focus 
of Porter’s analysis is on the profitability of an industry as a whole, those profits 
are just the sum of the profits of the individual firms, so we can view the “Five 
Forces” as applying to individual firms as well. 
Consider a cartel that includes all the firms in an industry. In the context of 
Figure 1, if the cartel is effective it eliminates—or at least reduces—the anti-
profit forces associated with the “rivalry among existing firms” at the center of 
Porter’s diagram. The incentive for such collusion may be powerful if interfirm 
rivalry is the primary drain on industry and firm profits. When is interfirm rivalry 
the primary drain on profits? We can answer this using Porter’s diagram. 
Interfirm rivalry is the primary drain on profit when the perimeter forces 
depressing profit are not strong—that is, if the threat of entry is small, demand 
for the industry’s product is relatively inelastic (meaning that there exist few 
substitutes), there are many small buyers, and factor inputs are largely acquired 
in a highly competitive marketplace. In addition, because collusion is designed to 
eliminate or at least reduce interfirm rivalry, collusion is especially valuable if 
                                                 
14  Id at 4. 
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firms’ products are close to perfect substitutes and if interfirm competition is 
largely based on price, because then interfirm rivalry has a strong depressing 
effect on industry and firm profits.  
The factors described in the previous paragraph have been characterized by 
Posner as those favorable to collusion.15 Consistent with how these factors are 
viewed in antitrust cases, if the perimeter forces working against profit are weak 
but the center force of interfirm rivalry is strong, the industry is ripe for 
collusion. Thus, Porter’s “Five Forces” framework provides an immediate way 
to view Section 1 violations.  
To adapt the diagram for use in the study of monopolization conduct, we 
make a slight modification. In Figure 2, we provide the same illustration of 
Porter’s “Five Forces” except that firms in the industry are divided into two 
groups, the cartel firms and the non-cartel firms, which are those that have 
either chosen not to participate in the cartel or have not been invited to join the 
cartel. In addition, we denote with separate arrows the relation of the cartel and 
non-cartel firms with the buyers and suppliers. Relations with potential entrants 
and substitutes continue to be represented with one arrow because one would 
expect these to affect both cartel and non-cartel firms in similar fashion. 
 
Industry
Rivalry among 
existing firms
Suppliers Buyers
Bargaining
power
of suppliers
Bargaining
power
of buyers
Potential
entrants
Threat of new entrants
Substitutes
Threat of substitute products
Cartel
Non-Cartel
 
 
Figure 2. Section 1 and Section 2 in the “Five Forces.” 
                                                 
15  Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 51–100 (Chicago 2d ed 2001). 
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As depicted in Figure 2, the firms in the cartel have suppressed interfirm 
rivalry among themselves, but non-cartel firms continue to act as rivals with one 
another, as well as with the cartel firms. If the cartel firms only suppress rivalry 
among themselves, and take no additional actions in the market, then the non-
cartel firms benefit since they can earn supra-normal profits as a consequence of 
the conspiracy yet incur none of the costs associated with operating a cartel.  
However, viewing the cartel as a single dominant firm, we can now pose 
the question of what conduct the cartel could engage in that would be above and 
beyond the suppression of rivalry among the firms in the cartel. There are many 
possibilities in this regard but we envision four broad categories. The first 
category, which includes behavior designed to harm non-cartel rivals, can be 
disaggregated into five different types of behavior. 
 
1. Behavior designed to harm non-cartel rivals. 
a.  The cartel firms may take actions directed at non-cartel firms, such as 
initiating anti-dumping complaints with the goal of preventing foreign 
non-cartel firms from being able to undercut the artificially increased 
cartel price16 or withholding cost-reducing or quality-improving 
technology. The cartel may also put pressure on non-cartel firms to 
accommodate certain cartel actions. 
b.  The cartel firms may enter into contracts with their own buyers that 
are designed to harm the ability of the non-cartel firms to negotiate 
with those buyers. For example, the use of fidelity discounts, tying, or 
bundling by the cartel reduces buyers’ ability to substitute between 
firms in the industry. Non-cartel firms are harmed because these 
contracts increase buyer bargaining power vis-à-vis non-cartel firms. 
c.  The cartel firms may take predatory actions directed at the non-cartel 
firms’ buyers, such as undercutting the non-cartel prices and 
otherwise targeting the non-cartel firms’ buyers. 
d.  The cartel firms may deprive the non-cartel firms of supply or 
increase what the non-cartel firms must pay for inputs (raising rivals’ 
costs) through contractual arrangements, such as exclusivity, with 
cartel input suppliers.  
e.  The cartel firms may deprive the non-cartel firms of supply or 
increase what the non-cartel firms must pay for inputs (raising rivals’ 
costs) through interference with the non-cartel firms’ input suppliers. 
                                                 
16  Non-cartel firms that are within the same country or trading area as the cartel firms may benefit 
from anti-dumping tariffs imposed on foreign producers. 
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For example, if cartel firms are vertically integrated into a downstream 
market, and if they supply their downstream competitors, they may 
increase prices to disadvantage competitors in the downstream 
market.  
2. The cartel firms may engage in actions designed to deter entry. Entry 
deterrence may help non-cartel firms as well as cartel firms. Examples of 
anticompetitive behaviors that raise entry costs include exclusive or 
excessively long contracts with customers, large-volume long-term 
contracts with suppliers, capacity expansions, and tying. This behavior, 
along with other monopolization behaviors, may prolong the duration of a 
cartel.  
3. The cartel firms may engage in actions intended to reduce the 
attractiveness and/or availability of substitutes, or to bundle or tie its 
products together with complements. Examples may include investing in 
research that demonstrates the advantages of the cartel’s products and the 
hazards of the substitute products.  
4. Finally, to reduce rivalry, one of the cartel firms may purchase one of the 
non-cartel firms or a competitive asset of one of the non-cartel firms. 
 
We can relate this taxonomy of monopolization behaviors to Figure 2. 
Behaviors in Category 1.a, actions directed at a cartel’s horizontal competitors, 
are behaviors among firms that are inside the “Industry” box shown in Figure 2, 
although they may also involve a government authority as in the case of the 
abuse of anti-dumping provisions. Behaviors in Category 1.b are those 
implemented between the cartel and its own buyers, although they can affect the 
relation between those buyers and the non-cartel firms. Referring to Figure 2, 
this behavior affects the “Buyers” box shown in the figure as well as the 
relationships represented by the arrows shown in the figure between the cartel 
and non-cartel firms and the buyers. Behaviors in Category 1.c are those that 
focus on the relation between the non-cartel firms and their buyers. In Figure 2, 
this behavior affects the “Buyers” box and the arrow between the non-cartel 
firms and buyers. Behaviors in Category 1.d are those implemented between the 
cartel and its own suppliers, although they can affect the relation between those 
suppliers and the non-cartel firms. This behavior affects the “Suppliers” box and 
the arrows between the cartel and non-cartel firms and the suppliers. Behaviors 
in Category 1.e focus on the relation between the non-cartel firms and their input 
suppliers. They affect the “Suppliers” box and the arrow between the non-cartel 
firms and suppliers.  
Behaviors in Category 2 relate to potential entrants. Referring to Figure 2, 
these behaviors act on the “Potential Entrants” box shown there. Behaviors in 
Category 3 relate to substitutes. These behaviors affect the “Substitutes” box in 
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Figure 2. The fourth category includes behavior that changes which firms are 
included in the cartel. These behaviors affect the division between “Cartel” and 
“Non-Cartel” firms within the “Industry” box in Figure 2. Thus, all aspects of 
Figure 2 are captured in these categories. Thus, the source of industry profits as 
identified by Michael Porter are often fully recognized and addressed by cartels, 
starting with the groundwork of interfirm rivalry suppression and then spreading 
out to the four spokes in Figure 2. 
A cartel’s first step is to control intra-cartel rivalry through Section 1 
behavior. The other four forces that influence industry profit are also potential 
targets for anticompetitive manipulation, either by a single dominant producer 
or by a cartel that has successfully turned itself into a dominant producer 
through its Section 1 behavior. Exclusive dealing, predatory behavior directed at 
non-cartel firms, entry deterrence, tying, and other similar conduct can be used 
to suppress competition that might threaten the dominance of the cartel.  
One conjecture is that once a cartel controls intra-cartel rivalry, it moves 
on to implement practices designed to diminish competition from existing and 
potential non-cartel rivals. Such conduct would constitute Section 2 violations 
when practiced by a dominant firm. Thus, cartel conduct can provide a window 
to understanding anticompetitive monopolization conduct. 
III. CARTELS ENGAGED IN MONOPOLIZATION CONDUCT 
This section provides a number of examples of cartels engaged in 
monopolization conduct. We do not attempt to provide a complete enumeration 
of such conduct over all known cartel cases. Instead, we focus on cases from 
two sources. First, we consider the European Commission (“EC”) cartel and 
price-fixing decisions related to manufactured products from 2000 to the 
present.17 Second, we consider the cartels for non-agricultural products described 
in the 1945 book Cartels in Action by Stocking and Watkins (“SW”).18 Table 1 
below provides specific citations to monopolization behaviors described in these 
sources. We give the relevant paragraph number for EC decisions and the 
relevant page number for SW.19  
                                                 
17  Non-manufacturing cases excluded from our analysis include EC Decisions in Fine Art Auction 
Houses, Case COMP/E-2/37.784, 30/07/2005 (Oct 30, 2002); Austrian Banks—‘Lombard Club,’ 
Case COMP/36.571/D-1, 2004/138/EC (June 11, 2002); Bank Charges for Exchanging Euro-Zone 
Currencies—Germany, Case COMP/E-1/37.919, 2003/25/EC (Dec 11, 2001). 
18  George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action (Hein 1945).  
19  The paragraphs from the EC decisions cited here are available at Randal D. Heeb et al, Cartels as 
Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct (Jan 2009) appendix, available 
online at <http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~marx/bio/papers/CATSM_Appendix.pdf> (visited 
Apr 5, 2009).  
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Table 1: Cartels and Monopolization Conduct 
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When analyzing the table, it is important to note that just because we have 
no indicator for a particular monopolization behavior does not mean the 
behavior did not occur. It simply means the behavior was not described in the 
EC case or SW chapter.  
Also, it is important to note that the conducts described for the EC 
decisions are not restricted to the European Community. Many of these cartels 
are international and the conducts described had impact throughout the world, 
including the United States. Examples include the Vitamins cartel20 and the Citric 
Acid cartel.21 Furthermore, the monopolization conducts described in SW are 
largely international in nature.22 
The columns correspond to the points enumerated in Section II regarding 
Figure 2.  
We begin by mentioning some behaviors that are not included in the table 
since they are not clearly monopolization behaviors, yet these forms of conduct 
go beyond the suppression of intra-cartel rivalry. First, in Vitamins,23 the cartel 
purchased the product of non-cartel rivals to prevent that supply from 
disrupting the cartel agreement and the cartel’s attempts to increase price. 
Second, a number of cases mention coordinated attempts to control the 
behavior of distributors. These include Specialty Graphite,24 Choline Chloride,25 
Amino Acids,26 Plasterboard,27 Steel,28 and Incandescent Electric Lamp.29  
Returning to Table 1, a number of features stand out. First, every column 
in Table 1 has an entry. Cartels engage in a broad range of dominant-firm 
behaviors. It is interesting that there are no entries among the EC cases 
involving the cartel’s use of exclusivity or other contractual agreements with its 
suppliers designed to deprive non-cartel rivals of supply, although such behavior 
is described in SW. This observation may indicate that EC analysis tends not to 
focus on the effect of a cartel on input suppliers. Overall, a fundamental point 
that emerges from this paper is that enforcement authorities should be looking 
                                                 
20  Vitamins, Case COMP/E-1/37.512, 2003/2/EC, ¶¶ 287–88 (Nov 21, 2001) (describing the 
purchase of a US producer of vitamin B2).  
21  Citric Acid, Case No COMP/E-1/36 604, 2002/742/EC, ¶¶ 116, 166 (Dec 5, 2001) (describing 
predatory conduct against Chinese producers that was not regionally restricted). 
22  Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action at 3–6 (cited in note 18).  
23  Vitamins, Case COMP/E-1/37.512, ¶¶ 287, 432, 447. 
24  Specialty Graphite, Case COMP/E-2/37.667, ¶¶ 137, 147, 383 (Dec 17, 2002).  
25  Choline Chloride, Case COMP/E-2/37.533, ¶¶ 69, 75, 99, 138 (Dec 9, 2004).  
26  Amino Acids, Case COMP/36.545/F3, OJ (L152), ¶ 162 (June 7, 2000).  
27  Plasterboard, Case COMP/E-1/37.152, C(2002)4570 Final, ¶ 364 (Nov 27, 2002).  
28  Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action at 190–91 (cited in note 18). 
29  Id at 307. 
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past the narrow issue of the suppression of interfirm rivalry in cartel 
investigations, expanding the scope of their investigations to monopolization 
conducts of all sorts and varieties that cartels may subsequently adopt once the 
cartel begins to function as a single dominant firm. For example, when 
addressing amnesty applicants and in depositions, antitrust authorities could ask 
whether there were any monopolization conducts and inquire about the specific 
conducts listed in Table 1. Parties damaged could also be asked about the 
presence of monopolization conduct.  
Second, some rows have no entries. In other words, for some cartels there 
is nothing in the record that we reviewed that suggests monopolization-like 
conduct. This observation does not imply the absence of such behaviors by 
these cartels, but rather that there was nothing reported regarding such conduct. 
One might hypothesize that some cartels did not engage in monopolization 
because they were having difficulties with the basic suppression of rivalry and so 
the cartel was unable to achieve the market power necessary to function as a 
dominant entity and engage in monopolization. Such a hypothesis suggests that 
we would observe less monopolization behavior from relatively ineffective 
cartels and more from effective cartels. There are examples in our data that 
support this, such as the cartel in Carbonless Paper,30 which appears to have been 
relatively ineffective, and for which there is no evidence of monopolization 
conduct. However, our data are insufficient to allow us to make a firm 
conclusion. For example, the Food Flavour Enhancers cartel appears to have been 
relatively effective,31 but we find no evidence in the record of monopolization 
conduct.32  
Third, for the EC cases, behavior directed specifically at deterring entry is 
relatively uncommon while, in contrast, this same conduct is pervasively 
reported in SW. This difference may reflect the fact that SW reports the 
historical evolution of an industry, and the cartels within it, so it would be more 
natural for long-term conduct such as entry deterrence to be reported by SW 
than by the EC, where the latter is analyzing a specific violation.  
                                                 
30  Carbonless Paper, Case COMP/E-1/36.212, 2004/337/EC, ¶¶ 166, 106 (Dec 20, 2001) (including 
discussion of how certain attempted price increases were ineffective and concerns about 
cheating). 
31  Food Flavour Enhancers, Case COMP/C.37.671, 2004/206/EC, ¶ 64 (Dec 17, 2002). The execution 
of “counterpurchase agreements” by the cartel suggests few problems with monitoring and 
enforcement within the cartel. 
32  With regard to Food Flavour Enhancers, the leading firm in this cartel is Ajinomoto (“Aji”). Aji 
produces a full range of amino acids and was a member of the Lysine cartel. See id, ¶ 136. The 
absence of monopolization conduct for Aji-cartels is perhaps suggestive of the EC’s inability to 
gain access to a Japanese firm’s company records through investigatory processes. 
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Fourth, there are some EC decisions that give attention to monopolization 
behavior such as those in Vitamins,33 Graphites (including Specialty Graphites,34 
Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and Graphite Products,35 and Graphite Electrodes36), 
Incandescent Electric Lamps,37 and Chemicals.38 Firms in industries with a history of 
successful cartel activity that includes a relatively full portfolio of 
monopolization conduct may warrant extra attention from enforcement 
authorities.39 
Depending on how one is using these data, alternative ways of categorizing 
the behaviors may be useful. For example, it might be useful to organize the data 
in terms of whether the monopolization behavior was implemented through 
contracts or negotiations, such as exclusive dealing, bundling, tying, conditional 
rebates, and certain vertical restraints, or perhaps whether it relied on 
governmental process, such as patent abuse, innovation suppression, standards 
abuse, or other torts or extortion as part of an attempt to monopolize. In 
particular, a well-designed taxonomy could be of great assistance to antitrust 
enforcement authorities.  
In this light, finally, it is important for antitrust enforcement authorities to 
realize that the initiation of monopolization conduct by non-dominant firms in a 
concentrated industry may be an indicator of cartel activity, especially when 
observed following a period of unexpected price increases. This potential cartel 
detection mechanism has three advantages. First, monopolization conducts may 
be more observable than the suppression of interfirm rivalry (for example, 
exclusive dealing is easier to observe than bid rigging). Second, the enforcement 
investigation is triggered by a combination of observable changes in firm 
behavior and data analysis. Third, once firms understand that such conduct 
increases the likelihood of a cartel investigation, firms engaged in cartel activity 
will be deterred from such conduct, the payoff to collusion will drop through 
the mitigation of some cartel monopolization conducts, and cartel conduct will 
be somewhat deterred. 
In summary, monopolization conduct by cartels is relatively common, but 
there appears to be substantial variation between cartels in the extent and nature 
                                                 
33  Vitamins, COMP/E-1/37.512, 2001 OJ (L6), ¶ 2.  
34  Specialty Graphite, Case COMP/E-2/37.667, ¶¶ 1–3. 
35  Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and Graphite Products, Case C.38.359, 2004/420/EC, ¶¶ 1–3 (Dec 3, 
2003).  
36  Graphite Electrodes, Case COMP/E-1/36.490, 202/271/EC, ¶¶ 1–2 (July 18, 2001).  
37  Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action at 304–62 (cited in note 18).  
38  Id at 363–429. 
39  The cartels in Incandescent Electric Lamps and Alkalies, Explosives, and the Grand Alliance, as described 
by Stocking and Watkins, are good examples. See id at 304–62, 430–48.  
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 228 Vol. 10 No. 1 
of this conduct. It is important that public enforcement authorities, when 
investigating specific cartels, gather exhaustive information about 
monopolization conduct, including the motivations and intents for these 
conducts as revealed by cartel participants, so as to advance our understanding 
of monopolization. 
IV. CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Recognition of the analytical and behavioral links between the historically 
separate areas of cartel and dominant-firm behavior suggests a number of future 
directions for public enforcement policy and research by competition 
authorities. First, competition agencies should more fully explore and catalogue 
evidence of monopolization conduct on the part of cartels. Economists and 
lawyers within the public agencies in Europe and the United States have 
incomparably large bodies of data involving cartels, and other competition 
agencies have access to an increasingly broad range of information regarding the 
conduct of cartels. This information has the potential to extend well beyond the 
kind of standard descriptions that are found in EC decisions or in published case 
reports in the United States.40 If this work is undertaken effectively inside public 
agencies that traditionally have placed cartel and monopolization matters in 
discrete compartments, then perhaps the artificial nature of this 
compartmentalization will become obvious and the experience of those who 
have focused on cartel cases will add to the analyses of those addressing 
monopolization concerns.  
Second, we need to understand better the information reported in EC 
decisions and other official accounts of cartels. Decisions written narrowly to 
describe only Section 1 violations may truncate many monopolization behaviors. 
In other words, the omission of Section 2 conduct in a description of a Section 1 
violation does not necessarily imply the absence of Section 2 conduct.  
Third, we need to understand under what circumstances cartels extend past 
the suppression of intra-cartel rivalry and move into the realm of 
monopolization conduct. A number of conjectures arise in this regard. If a cartel 
struggles to suppress interfirm rivalry among its members, then it seems unlikely 
the cartel can undertake monopolization conduct. In other words, a cartel has to 
function as a single dominant firm in order to move forward with some kind of 
monopolization conduct.  
                                                 
40  Many of the cases included in Table 1 have US counterparts involving many of the same market 
participants. Examples include: Amino Acids (Lysine), Citric Acid, Choline Chloride, Graphite Electrodes, 
and Vitamins. 
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Fourth, some cartels engage in a full range of monopolization behaviors. 
As Table 1 shows, examples include Vitamins, Specialty Graphites, Incandescent 
Electric Lamps, and Chemicals. Other cartels engage only in a limited set of 
monopolization conduct. What accounts for this heterogeneity? There are many 
ways for a cartel to increase its members’ profits. It is reasonable to assume that 
cartels select those behaviors that offer the greatest expected return. Thus, 
heterogeneity in the use of monopolization behavior may be explained by 
heterogeneity in the expected returns from those behaviors across different 
cartels. It remains an open question what features of an industry, product, and 
marketplace help explain these differences.  
Fifth, as a direct lesson for the study of monopolization conduct, we argue 
that when a successful cartel engages in such activities there may be a 
presumption that the activity is not procompetitive. Cartels exist to suppress 
competition. When a cartel goes past the suppression of intra-cartel rivalry to 
initiate or coordinate additional conduct known to be potentially 
anticompetitive, it seems reasonable to assert that such conduct is 
anticompetitive in this situation. This observation is valuable because it suggests 
that cross-industry comparisons can help us understand the procompetitive and 
anticompetitive nature of such conduct. For example, if we see a particular form 
of exclusive dealing by cartel firms in the auto industry, then the same kind of 
exclusive dealing by a single dominant firm in the truck industry may be of much 
greater concern than one might have thought before understanding the conduct 
in the auto case. 
To give another example, loyalty rebates are one practice that, theoretically 
speaking, can sometimes be procompetitive and sometimes anticompetitive.41 
We see evidence of the anticompetitive use of loyalty discounts by cartels in 
Vitamins42 and Soda Ash—Solvay.43 Further examination of these cases may shed 
light on general circumstances in which loyalty discounts should be of concern 
to antitrust authorities.  
Sixth, what is the incremental social harm that a cartel could do by moving 
past the suppression of interfirm rivalry and toward monopolization conduct? 
This question is relevant for merger policy. Coordinated effects analyses typically 
do not address the possibility of monopolization conduct arising from post-
                                                 
41  Loyalty rebates are retrospective rebates awarded based on meeting targets for sales, purchases, 
market shares, etc. over a fixed period of time. For a discussion of legal issues surrounding loyalty 
rebates, see generally Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics at 570–79 (cited 
in note 10). 
42  Vitamins, COMP/E-1/37.512, ¶ 714.  
43  Soda Ash—Solvay, COMP/33.133-C, OJ (L10), ¶ 53 (Dec 13, 2000).  
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 230 Vol. 10 No. 1 
merger coordination. However, such conduct is a potential social harm, so the 
antitrust agencies should consider this when reviewing a merger.  
Seventh, the study of cartel monopolization conduct has implications for 
determining the standing of non-cartel firms to bring private suits against the 
cartel. Courts sometimes deny non-cartel participants in the industry standing to 
sue the cartel on the ground that the suppression of interfirm rivalry within the 
cartel yields price-raising benefits to non-participants. However, if a cartel is 
engaged in predation or in other anticompetitive conduct that damages 
horizontal non-cartel producers, then perhaps consideration should be given to 
allowing those firms to have standing to challenge the monopolization behavior. 
The logic would be that exclusionary conduct undertaken by the cartel may 
damage non-cartel rivals. Without a guilty plea or a criminal finding of both 
collusion and attempted monopolization, a non-cartel firm may find the task of 
appearing before a court to seek damages from such predation daunting and the 
court unreceptive.  
Eighth, the time series nature of the evolution of the conduct can be 
informative.44 Cartel meetings that previously were dedicated to coordinating the 
suppression of rivalry may start to have new agenda items related to 
monopolization conduct.45 These are perhaps put into place slowly. The costs of 
implementing them may be divided among the cartel participants.46 Although the 
discovery records for cartels are not often read from the perspective of Section 2 
violations, we argue that these records provide insights into monopolization 
conduct within industries where there is a single dominant firm.  
Ninth, suppose there is an oligopolistic industry with no dominant firm 
and with no known cartel, yet some firms, perhaps smaller ones, are subject to 
predatory conduct and other behavior associated with Section 2 violations. The 
initiation of such conduct might provide evidence that a cartel exists. Consider 
the predatory conduct enumerated in Table 1. The cartels seem to have 
undertaken this conduct only after the cartel was formed. We are not aware of 
instances in which antitrust agencies have used the emergence of alleged 
                                                 
44  See William E. Kovacic et al, Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel in V. Ghosal and 
J. Stennek, eds, The Political Economy of Antitrust, Contributions to Economic Analysis Series 149, 150–
152 (Elsevier 2007) (providing an analysis of cartel beginning and ending dates in Vitamins). 
45  See generally Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, and Matthew E. Raiff, Price Announcements: The 
Vitamins Industry, 26 Intl J Ind Org 762 (2008) (discussing how timing of cartel price 
announcements in Vitamins can be related to timing of cartel meetings).  
46  For example, in the EC’s Copper Plumbing Tubes decision, the Commission noted the costs of 
“advertising campaigns and related activities” were shared among cartel members “on the basis of 
sold tonnage.” Copper Plumbing Tubes, COMP/E-1/38.069, ¶ 141 (Sept 3, 2004).  
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monopolization conduct in an oligopolistic industry to begin an inquiry for the 
presence of a cartel.  
Tenth, the abuse of government regulations by cartels to thwart entry and 
damage non-cartel firms is well chronicled. A cartel may pursue and win an anti-
dumping claim against a foreign competitor, essentially using the government 
process as an entry deterrent and/or predatory device.  
In summary, we hope the type of analysis proposed here can be useful in 
guiding antitrust authorities as to where they should direct monopolization 
resources. One implication of this Article is that antitrust authorities should not 
segregate the analysis of Section 1 and Section 2 cases. A second implication is 
that antitrust authorities pursuing Section 1 violations should aggressively 
investigate the presence or absence of monopolization behaviors by the cartel, 
including the deliberations among cartel members associated with these 
behaviors. 
For many monopolization behaviors there are tradeoffs between the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects of the behavior. This justifies the 
use of a rule-of-reason standard in these cases. But because the rule of reason is 
applied, a deep understanding of the motivations for and implications of 
monopolization conduct is required in order to successfully prosecute and deter 
anticompetitive behavior. We argue that one way to move in the direction of 
that deeper understanding is to maximize the information gained from cartel 
prosecutions regarding monopolization conduct and to use that information to 
inform the analysis of monopolization cases. 
In our ongoing research, we will continue to investigate the issues 
discussed here and the features of cartel structure more generally. Our 
investigation of the structure of cartels has the potential to help us understand 
the additional tradeoffs relevant for cartels considering monopolization 
behavior. For example, there may be monopolization behaviors that are 
profitable for the cartel but that leave smaller cartel members in a precarious 
position should the cartel dissolve.47 In this case, there may not be consensus 
within the cartel to engage in the behavior. Thus, a cartel’s structure can be 
expected to influence the conduct in which it engages. We hope our 
investigations of cartel structure will shed light on these issues, and, as 
emphasized in this Article, potentially benefit our understanding of the behavior 
of single dominant firms. 
                                                 
47  An example would be establishing the largest cartel member as a buying agent for inputs for the 
cartel, supported by exclusive dealing provisions between input suppliers and the largest cartel 
member. 
